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I. Introduction 
When Congress granted the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) authority to 
regulate tobacco products in 2009,
1 many people may have been surprised that the agency 
did not already possess this authority. Perhaps this is because a comprehensive regulatory 
regime for tobacco already existed on the federal level. In fact, it was the existence of this 
“comprehensive federal program” that Justice O’Conner stated as evidence of Congress’s 
intent to “preclude [the FDA] from exercising significant policymaking authority on the 
subject of smoking and health” in FDA v. Brown & Williamson.
2 Other federal entities 
have exercised, or attempted to exercise, authority over aspects of tobacco production and 
                                                        
1 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, 21 U.S.C. 387 (2009). 
2 FDA v. Brown and Williamson Tobacco Co., 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
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In contrast to the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Act of 2009, which appears 
to  preserve  a  strong  role  for  states  and  cities  to  participate  in  and  strengthen  tobacco 
regulation,  the  Federal  Cigarette  Labeling  and  Advertising  Act  (FCLAA)  has  placed 
significant limitations on the anti-tobacco policies that local governments can enforce. This 
paper  argues  that  cities  may  have  unique  needs  not  adequately  addressed  by  federal 
regulations and that, as a normative matter, they should be able to pass laws that better 
reflect the needs and desires of their residents.  
Using New York City as an example, I will illustrate three cases in which city ordinances 
have  been  invalidated  by  federal  preemption  under  FCLAA.  I  will  explain  the  type  of 
analysis in which judges have typically engaged in order to find preemption in these cases. 
These  judges  have  tended  to  place  a  strong  emphasis  on  the  values  codified  by  the 
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution while de-emphasizing the presumption 
against preemption for regulations that implicate states’ traditional police powers.  
   2 
sales for decades. For example, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has regulated 
labeling on cigarette packages since 1965,
3 Congress banned tobacco advertising on 
television and radio in 1971
4 and on domestic commercial airline flights in 1989,
5 and the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration proposed (and later withdrew) indoor air 
quality regulations with the goal of curtailing smoking in public areas and in workplaces 
in 1994.
6  
The political process that sometimes culminates with the passage of a significant 
statute like the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009 (FSPTCA) 
tends to involve debates and compromises that take into account the interests and the 
potential role of many federal agencies, courts, politicians, and the regulated industry. 
Too often missing from the conversation is the question of what role cities can and 
should play in determining an appropriate regulatory scheme for tobacco. In the case of 
the 2009 Act, the scope of that role is being worked out through court adjudication.
7 In a 
recent case, U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Mfg. Co., LLC v. City of New York, a federal court 
read FSPTCA as preserving a role for cities to enact and enforce laws that create more 
stringent regulations.
8 FSPTCA contains a “preservation clause” that explicitly states that 
its provisions should not be construed to limit this role of municipalities.
9 Additionally, 
                                                        
3 Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. 1331 et seq. (1965) 
4 Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act, 15 U.S.C. 1335 (1969) 
5 Martin Tolchin, House Would Extend Smoking Ban on U.S. Flights, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
1, 1989.  
6 Indoor Air Quality, Proposed Rules, Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration, 66 F.R. 64946-01 (2001) 
7 Daniel A .Klein, Validity, Construction, and Application of Family Smoking Prevention 
and Tobacco Control Act (FSPTCA), 53 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 465, § 13 (2011)  
8 U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Mfg. Co., LLC v. City of New York, 703 F. Supp. 2d 329, 343 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
9 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, 21 U.S.C. 387(p)(a)(1)   3 
FSPTCA contains a “savings clause” that limits the applicability of the statute’s 
preemption provision so that it does not apply to city rules that regulate tobacco sales and 
distribution.
10 The court in U.S. Smokeless Tobacco observed that “Congress expressed a 
clear and unmistakable preference for limiting the federal government's role to setting a 
floor below which no local sales regulations could go, while remaining sensitive to 
differing sensibilities about the use of tobacco products in different parts of the 
country.”
11  
By contrast, the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965 
(FCLAA) includes an explicit preemption provision
12 that courts have cited to overturn 
local ordinances on several occasions. Using New York City as an example, this paper 
will explore the limitations that the preemption provision of FCLAA has placed on cities’ 
ability to pursue local strategies to discourage smoking. I will argue that cities have a 
special need to supplement federal tobacco regulations with ordinances tailored to local 
“sensibilities,” as the court in U.S. Smokeless Tobacco recognized, and I will explore the 
history of the relationship between cities and other government entities that defines the 
scope of municipal autonomy today. Lastly, I will illustrate three instances in which New 
York City (City) policies have been preempted by FCLAA in order to illustrate the very 
real limitations that federal preemption can place on a city’s flexibility and authority to 
pursue local goals.  
                                                        
10 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, 21 U.S.C. 387(p)(a)(2)(b) 
11 U.S. Smokeless Tobacco, 703 F. Supp., 344-45 
12 Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 USC § 1334   4 
II. Background 
A. The Need for Local Cigarette Regulation 
  There is no doubt that New York City has actively tried to discourage cigarette 
use within its borders. The City, with varying degrees of success, has attempted to ban 
cigarette use in bars and restaurants
13 and beaches and parks,
14 impose and increase taxes 
on sales of cigarettes,
15 and require cigarette vendors to display posters with grotesque 
images discouraging smoking at locations where cigarettes are sold.
16 Yet, one might ask 
whether it is necessary for this type of regulation to occur at the municipal level while 
state and federal governments have created a comprehensive regulatory regime 
addressing many of the same issues New York City has sought to address, and while 
these higher level of governments may have greater access to resources and ability to 
create uniform requirements throughout the country.  
  The implications of cigarette use in New York City, and other cities like it, are 
simply different from the country as a whole and from those of New York State (the 
State). First, the impact of second-hand smoking may be more severe in New York City 
than elsewhere. Second, the City’s smoking rates are lower than that of the State and the 
Country, so fewer smokers are causing a disproportionate amount of harm from the 
impact of second-hand smoke exposure. Third, as a normative matter, cities should be 
allowed to enact and enforce laws that are more protective of public health than State and 
                                                        
13 Jennifer Steinhauer, Bloomberg Seeks to Ban Smoking in Every City Restaurant and 
Bar, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2002. 
14 Javier C. Hernandez, Smoking Ban for Beaches and Parks Is Approved, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 2, 2011. 
15 Michael Cooper, Cigarettes Up To $7 a Pack With New Tax, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2002. 
16 Anahad O’Connor, Judge Rejects City Law on Antismoking Posters, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
29, 2010.   5 
Federal laws, especially when these local laws are representative of the unique needs and 
preferences of their residents or are enacted in response to heightened danger or special 
circumstances.  
Many New Yorkers who do not use tobacco products are chronically exposed to 
cigarette smoke.
17 Second-hand smoke inhalation is a bigger problem in New York City 
than in much of the rest of the country. While in the United States an average of 44.9% of 
non-smokers have elevated levels of a nicotine metabolite used to detect second-hand 
smoke exposure, in New York City the prevalence of this metabolite in non-smokers is 
56.7%.
18 Exposure to toxins in second-hand smoke can cause asthma, cancer, and 
cardiovascular disease.
19 Particles in second-hand smoke can linger in the air for hours, 
and cling to hair, clothing, and furniture.
20 Surprisingly, exposure is a problem even for 
those who do not live or work with smokers. New York City health officials have 
reported that, “people seated within three feet of a smoker are exposed to roughly the 
same levels of secondhand smoke, regardless of whether they are indoors or outdoors.”
21 
Anyone who has walked through midtown Manhattan knows that it would be quite a 
challenge to remain more than three feet of a smoker for even one block.   
The statistics about the prevalence of second-hand smoke exposure in New York 
City become even more striking when one considers that the proportion of people who 
                                                        
17 Roni Caryn Rabin, New Yorkers Often Exposed to Cigarette Smoke, Study Finds, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 08, 2009.  
18 Jennifer A. Ellis, Charon Gwynn, Renu K. Garg, Robyn Philburn, Kenneth M. Aldous, 
Sarah B. Perl, Lorna Thorpe and Thomas R. Frieden, Secondhand smoke exposure among 
nonsmokers nationally and in New York City, Nicotine and Tobacco Research (2009) 
19 Mayo Clinic Staff, Secondhand smoke: Avoid dangers in the air, available at, 
http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/secondhand-smoke/CC00023 (accessed Mar. 22, 
2011) 
20 Id. 
21 Hernandez, Smoking Ban for Beaches and Parks Is Approved.    6 
are smokers in New York City is much lower than in the nation as a whole, meaning that 
fewer smokers are responsible for more second-hand smoke exposure in the City. Most 
likely as a result of both years of regulation discouraging cigarette use and evolving 
social norms that increasingly disapprove of smoking, cigarette use in New York City has 
reached its lowest rate on record.
22 As of 2009, the rate was 15.8% in the city,
23 as 
compared with 20.6% in the nation
24 and 18.0% in New York State.
25 At first one might 
think the relatively low smoking rate in New York City indicates that the City does not 
need greater freedom to supplement State and Federal regulations with its own 
ordinances. However, the City’s uniquely low smoking rate may mean that the City 
actually faces special challenges in reducing its smoking rate further. Strategies for 
lowering a population’s smoking rate may need to change as the rate continues to 
decrease, as the “hold-outs” who do not quit after the first regulations are in place may 
require a different impetus to do so. Additionally, the population of smokers might differ 
in urban areas like New York City. For example, the age, gender, education level, or 
income distribution could be dissimilar, and different cessation promotion strategies may 
not be equally effective among these different groups.  
                                                        
22 Press Release, New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, New York 
City Smoking Rates Fall to Lowest Rate on Record, (May 5, 2009), available at, 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/html/pr2009/pr023-09.shtml (accessed Mar. 22, 2011) 
23 Id.  
24 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Vital Signs: Current Cigarette Smoking 
Among Adults Aged ≥ 18 Years―United States, 2009. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly 
Report 2010;59(35):1135–40. 
25 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance 
System, Prevalance and Trends Data, New York – 2009 Tobacco Use, available at 
http://apps.nccd.cdc.gov/BRFSS/display.asp?cat=TU&yr=2009&qkey=4396&state=NY 
(accessed Mar. 22, 2011).  
   7 
  Federal Laws to regulate tobacco products must try to create one-size fit all rules 
for the country in order to promote uniformity for regulated parties. With large and 
powerful cigarette companies holding a strong stake in minimizing regulation of their 
products, there may be a thumb on the scale against more stringent regulations. The 
tobacco industry would, reasonably, oppose inconsistent obligations from state to state or 
from city to city, yet some localities may have a heightened need and desire to regulate 
tobacco products and purchasing. Allowing cities to do so, as courts have interpreted 
FSPTCA to do, will create a legal regime that is more closely tailored to the needs of the 
American people without necessarily undermining the purpose of federal law or creating 
inconsistent obligations. For example, cities often pass ordinances that do not regulate the 
tobacco product or advertisement itself, such as laws that affect the location of cigarette 
sales or advertising. If the consensus of the people and, by extension, the administration 
in New York City is that smoking should be more aggressively discouraged than federal 
law mandates, that decision should receive deference unless it clearly undermines federal 
law. As a public health matter, we should support local efforts to promulgate rules that 
are more protective of public health without interfering with the preferences and 
decisions of other localities. 
New York City, at least during the so far nine-year Bloomberg Administration, 
has been uniquely committed to promoting the public health of its citizens.
26 City 
initiatives include a “smoking ban in indoor workplaces, increased cigarette taxes, 
                                                        
26 NYC death rates at all-time low, United Press International, Dec. 30, 2010, available 
at, http://www.upi.com/Health_News/2010/12/30/NYC-death-rates-at-all-time-low/UPI-
83441293756209/ (accessed Mar. 22, 2011).   8 
educational campaigns, and promotion of smoking cessation programs.”
27 Perhaps this 
focus is at least partially due to the relatively large share of deaths in the City that 
smoking causes. In fact “within New York City, roughly 7,500 people die from smoking 
annually – more than from AIDS, homicide, and suicide combined.”
28 To discourage the 
City from continuing to pursue these types of policies would be to effectively limit the 
City’s ability to provide necessary and desired protections for its people unless these 
protections are the same as those needed by the rest of the state or the nation.  
 
B. A Brief History of City Autonomy 
An understanding of the historical and legal framework that defines the 
relationship between cities and other government entities is useful to provide context for 
this paper’s discussion of the preemption issues New York City has faced with respect to 
tobacco regulation. As a starting point, it is helpful to consider the influential views of 
Alexander Hamilton and James Madison, who expressed concern about the prospect of 
decentralization of power in states and localities.
29 Their series of essays, collectively 
called the Federalist Papers,
30 expressed a vision of a Republic in which power was 
centralized in order to avoid the tyranny of the majority – a state in which a slight 
minority of people would be constantly oppressed. Madison feared that decentralization 
would cause a splintering of the people into factions that would create the existence of 
                                                        
27 23-34 94th St. Grocery Corp. v. New York City Bd. of Health, 10 CIV 4392 JSR, 2010 
WL 5392876 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2010), Declaration of Thomas A. Farley, Commissioner 
of the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene. 
28 Id.  
29 See Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Jay, The Federalist Papers, Yale 
University Press (2009). 
30 John Jay also contributed 5 articles to the series of 85 articles.    9 
numerous lawless classes that would ultimately deprive the wealthy minority of their 
property. His view of democracies was of “spectacles of turbulence and contention... 
incompatible with personal security or the rights of property,”
31 and his solution was to 
“extend the sphere” of influence by centralizing power in one large republic.
32  
Madison and Hamilton expressed their views about the importance of the 
Supremacy Clause,
33 under which federal law may preempt state or city law in the case of 
a conflict. Hamilton characterized the principle of the Clause as inherent in the political 
structure of the nation: “A clause which declares the supremacy of the laws of the 
Union…only declares a truth, which flows immediately and necessarily from the 
institution of a federal government.”
34 Madison defended the Supremacy Clause as vital 
to the functioning of the nation,  
“without  which  [the  Constitution]  would  have  been  evidently  and  radically 
defective…The world would have seen, for the first time, a system of government 
founded on an inversion of the fundamental principles of all government; it would 
have  seen  the  authority  of  the  whole  society  every  where  subordinate  to  the 
authority of the parts; it would have seen a monster, in which the head was under 
the direction of the members."
35 
 
This potential “inversion” was viewed as something the drafters of the Constitution had 
wisely chosen to avoid by their inclusion of the Supremacy Clause.  
Yet cities in America have been envisioned as “experimental communities,” 
where ideas are tested as communities “[try] out different patterns.”
36 Economist Charles 
Tibout described a model of decentralized power in which “consumer-voters” move to 
                                                        
31 James Madison, Federalist No. 10 (1787). 
32 Id.  
33 Constitution of the United States, U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 6, cl. 2. 
34 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 33 (1788). 
35 James Madison, Federalist No. 44 (1788).  
36 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974).   10 
the communities that best satisfy their set of preferences.
37 Tibout’s idea assumes a large 
variance in the patterns of public goods cities offer, implying an underlying assumption 
that cities can shape their own identity to reflect the needs and desires of their residents. 
Similarly, Robert Nozick, a political philosopher and Harvard professor, discussed a 
libertarian system in which communities compete for residents thereby creating multiple 
co-existing utopias reflecting a range of individual choices.
38  
If Nozick and Tibout envisioned an idea of cities that is at all descriptive rather 
than idealistic, it may have more applicability in America’s early history than it does 
today. In colonial New England, the locus of power was found in individual towns.
39 In 
Massachusetts, the state was viewed as a collection of localities and state power an 
aggregation of local power. From the time of settlement until the American Revolution, it 
became increasingly clear to the government of Massachusetts that “the public 
peace…would have to be separately secured in each town in the province.” Further, 
“local institutions…became the prime political institutions of the new provincial 
society.”
40 When representatives of local governments in colonial Massachusetts felt the 
need to shift municipal law and policy to conform to local desires, they simply did so 
without interference from the state. Not only was “the Court’s acquiescence in those local 
desires…quite regular,” but “towns quite commonly set the law aside…when the law 
proved inconvenient for local purposes.”
41 
                                                        
37 Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, J. Pol. Econ. 416 (1956). 
38 Nozick, supra. 
39 Michael Zuckerman, Peaceable Kingdoms (1970).  
40 Id.  
41 Id.    11 
The manifestation of such flexible and overriding city power in colonial 
Massachusetts did not persist into the twentieth century. The modern conception of cities 
in the American governmental system was defined in the Supreme Court’s 1907 decision 
in Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh.
42 In Hunter, the plaintiffs opposed a decree entered by the 
State of Pennsylvania authorizing consolidation of the cities of Pittsburgh and Allegheny.  
Despite the fact that the majority of voters in Allegheny voted against the consolidation, 
the court held that a state’s action to unite two municipalities without approval by the 
majority of voters in each municipality did not violate due process of law. The 
implication of this decision, which has never been overruled, has been enormously 
significant: it means that a city is merely “the creature of the state.”
43 As a matter of 
federal constitutional law, states have “absolute discretion” over “the number, nature, and 
duration of the powers conferred upon” cities.
44  
The consequence of this inherent constraint in the structure of local government 
law places doubt on the classic vision of cities as a level of government that fosters 
experimentation and variety. The Supreme Court’s holding in Hunter did not imply that 
cities have no power whatsoever – clearly cities are authorized to act with respect to 
some local matters – so the question of just how restricted city power actually was 
remained unsettled.  Written in 1872 in a local government law treatise, “Dillon’s Rule” 
was one of the earliest attempts to answer this question.
45 According to this rule, city 
power must be traced to specific state legislative delegation. Further, the rule creates a 
presumption against the validity of city action. When a court finds “any fair, reasonable, 
                                                        
42 Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 US 161 (1907). 
43 City of Trenton v. State of New York, 262 US 182, 187 (1932) 
44 Hunter, at 178 
45 John Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5
th ed. 1911)   12 
substantial doubt concerning the existence of power…[it shall be] resolved…against the 
[municipal] corporation.”
46 This doctrine has been applied to severely limit city 
initiatives. For example, the town of Hurley, South Dakota was prevented from 
expanding food service at a city-owned bar,
47 and a rule promulgated in Arlington 
County, Virginia that would have extended employee health benefits to domestic partners 
of employees was invalidated.
48  
Although Dillon’s Rule is still applicable to some local governments, a movement 
towards greater city autonomy prompted many states to expressly reject the doctrine in 
favor of “Home Rule.” The home rule movement began in the late nineteenth century 
with the goal of ensuring that cities had power over local affairs and carving out an area 
of city autonomy free of state control.
49 Since Missouri became the first state to adopt 
home rule in 1875, most states have come to recognize some form of home rule.
50 
However, because home rule seeks to identify “a distinct sphere of local authority,”
51 the 
benefits of a home rule charter depend largely on judicial determinations about what 
issues should be considered of local concern.  
In practice, home rule provisions in state constitutions can be just as limiting as a 
regime based on Dillon’s Rule. The idea, established in Hunter, of the city as a creature 
of the state underlies and informs courts’ application of the home rule doctrine, and it has 
continued to support a “regime [that]...often encourages local governments to be cautious 
                                                        
46 Id.  
47 Olesen v. Town of Hurley, 619 N.W.2d 324 (S.D. 2004). 
48 Arlington County v. White, 528 S.E.2d 706 (Va. 2000). 
49 Gerald E. Frug, Richard T. Ford, and David J. Barron, Local Government Law (5
th Ed. 
2010) 167. 
50 Id, at 168. 
51 Id (emphasis added).   13 
and unimaginative.
52 This cautiousness may be well founded; municipalities acting under 
Home Rule have been prevented from acting in a wide range of situations: Montgomery 
County, Maryland was barred from creating a private cause of action that would have 
increased protection against employment discrimination;
53 New Orleans was prohibited 
from enforcing an ordinance establishing a minimum wage higher than the federal rate;
54 
and an ordinance passed in Telluride, Colorado requiring construction of affordable 
housing to mitigate new development was forced to yield to conflicting state law.
55 All of 
these attempts were struck down because, in the interest of uniformity across the state or 
the nation, the relevant law was not considered of purely local import. These cases might 
lead one to ask, what issues could be described as “purely” local? Would anything non-
trivial be left within a city’s sphere of autonomy? The combination of the Supremacy 
Clause with either a Dillion’s Rule or Home Rule regime may plausibly create a legal 
structure that discourages the pursuit of the kind of variety that Tiebout and Nozick 
envisioned.  
C. The Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act 
 
The Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, administered by the FTC, 
was enacted in 1965 with two announced purposes. The first was to inform the public 
about adverse health effects of cigarette smoking through warning notices on cigarette 
packages and advertisements.
56 The second, and more relevant to the preemption issue, 
                                                        
52 Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 2255 (2003). 
53 McCrory Corp. v. Fowler, 570 A.2d 834 (Md. 1990). 
54 New Orleans Campaign for a Living Wave v. City of New Orleans, 825 So.2d 1098 
(La. 2002).  
55 Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four Venture, L.L.C., 3 P.3d 30 (Colo. 2000).  
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was the purpose of protecting commerce and the national economy such that they are 
“not impeded by diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and advertising 
regulations with respect to any relationship between smoking and health.”
57 FCLAA sets 
out specific labeling requirements, mandating that all cigarette packages, advertisements, 
and outdoor billboards in the United States bare one of four “Surgeon General’s 
Warning” labels
58 on a rotating basis,
59 and specifying precise requirements for size, font, 
and placement of these labels.
60  
FCLAA contains an express preemption provision, which disallows additional 
requirements for any “statement relating to smoking health…on any cigarette package,” 
except pursuant to other federal acts.
61 The same section was amended by the Public 
Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 to explicitly preempt state laws that would impose 
requirements “with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages 
of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this Act,”
62 unless the 
regulation deals only with the “time, place, and manner, but not content of the advertising 
or promotion of any cigarettes.”
63 Other provisions of FCLAA prohibit advertisements of 
cigarettes on electronic forms of communication under the jurisdiction of the FCC,
64 
allow for criminal penalties
65 and injunctive proceedings
66 to be imposed on violators of 
the Act, exempts cigarettes for export (unless for distribution to members of the armed 
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forces),
67 and establishes a smoking research, education, and information program and 
interagency committee reporting to Congress.
68  
III. Preemption examples 
 
In recent years, Courts have found three New York City tobacco ordinances to be 
preempted, at least in part, by FCLAA. The first involved the City’s attempt in 1992 to 
require taxicabs to display one anti-smoking public health message for every four tobacco 
advertisements. The second, in 1998, restricted tobacco advertising near schools, 
playgrounds, and other places frequented by children. The third and most recent was an 
attempt by the city in 2009 to require cigarette vendors to display “gruesome” pictures of 
the negative health effects of smoking where cigarettes are sold. Although Congress' 
purpose to preempt such local regulation must be “clear and manifest” to “overcome the 
presumption that state and local regulation of health and safety matters can 
constitutionally coexist with federal regulation,”
69 this presumption has been insufficient 
to insulate these ordinances from FCLAA’s relatively explicit preemption provision.  
A. Taxicab Health Messages
70 
 
  In the early 1990’s, an anti-tobacco counter-advertising campaign was found 
preempted by FCLAA as it applied to a private company that sued the City. When New 
York passed the Tobacco Product Regulation Act (Local Law)
71 in October of 1992, the 
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Acting Commissioner of the New York City Department of Consumer Affairs called this 
law “the toughest and most sweeping anti-tobacco legislation in the country.”
72 The 
relevant, and most controversial, section of this ordinance requires that there be at least 
one public health anti-smoking message for every four advertisements promoting a 
tobacco product on any unit of advertising space.
73 Other sections of the same act 
prohibit sale of tobacco products on school property,
74 out-of-package,
75 by those less 
than 18 years of age,
76 to those less than 18 years of age,
77 and required merchants to 
display a sign stating that it is illegal to sell tobacco to minors.
78  
  As details of the public health message requirement were developed during 
hearings towards the end of 1992,
79 a heated debate was spurred. Even before it had been 
implemented, the Local Law pitted Mayor David Dinkins, City Council Speaker and Act 
sponsor Peter F. Vallone, and anti-smoking groups against tobacco companies and 
advertising companies,
80 including a company called Vango Media, Inc. (Vango) that 
sold advertising space on the roofs of taxicabs. Even the City acknowledged that the 
ordinance might be vulnerable to legal challenge; for example, lawyers for the Dinkins 
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administration acknowledged that the City might lack legal authority to apply the rule to 
baseball stadiums and to the Metropolitan Transportation Authority.
∗81 
Vango Media, a New York based company that was in the business of displaying 
advertisements on the roofs of taxicabs, challenged the ordinance as applied in the 
District Court for the Southern District of New York. The Company was at risk of 
suffering great losses if it were forced to display the City’s public health messages. 
Vango’s CEO, J. Rembrandt George, had been “instrumental in introducing the 
elongated, pyramid-like plasticized billboards that sit on top of many of New York City's 
taxicabs.”
82 The City contracted with Vango in 1975 to allow the rooftop taxicab ads, and 
both parties benefited financially from the deal – Vango received profits from ad sales 
and passed on some of that profit to the City in the form of a fifty dollars per taxicab fee 
for a one-year permit to carry exterior advertisements.
83 By the 1990’s, about one third of 
the City’s approximately thirteen-thousand car taxi fleet
84 of taxicabs carried advertising 
signs,
85 and Vango alone placed advertisements on sixteen-hundred of these taxis.
86  
The public health message requirement of the Tobacco Product Regulation Act 
would have required Vango to provide space for these messages free of charge, reducing 
income for the company both by tying up ad space for the city and by potentially driving 
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away tobacco advertisers. Advertisements for cigarettes were extremely prevalent among 
Vango’s ads – in fact, “Vango's taxi-top advertising primarily featured cigarette 
companies.”
87 No less than 75% of its advertising revenue came from cigarette 
advertisers.
88 Further, due to the terms of Vango’s contract with the Metropolitan Taxi 
Board of Trade, which represented fourteen hundred of Vango’s sixteen hundred taxis, 
Vango would have had to pay for the space on all of the company’s cabs, regardless of 
whether Vango was able to obtain advertising to fill the space.
89 Considering how central 
tobacco advertising was to Vango’s business, the public health message provision of the 
Act posed a grave threat.  
  Vango alleged six causes of action in its attempt to overturn the provision or at 
least invalidate its applicability to the City’s taxi fleet, and the company sought summary 
judgment on three of these claims. First, Vango claimed that FCLAA preempted the 
provision. Next, the company claimed that the law violated its First Amendment Rights 
by requiring it to display messages contrary to the cigarette advertisements it displays. 
Last, Vango claimed that, with respect to some of its advertising, it was exempt from the 
law because of the terms of its contract with the City.
90 The judge granted summary 
judgment to Vango on the basis of his holding that FCLAA preempted the Local Law as 
it was applied to privately owned taxicabs for whose advertising space the city issued 
permits.
91 The court did not express an opinion on the other grounds for summary 
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judgment offered by Vango, and it did not reach the issue of whether the Federal Act 
preempts the Local Law as applied to City-owned property. 
  The Court cited the Supreme Court’s ruling in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc,
92 a 
case that considered whether civil damage actions were preempted by FCLAA, to support 
its conclusion that “Congress intended to preempt precisely the type of local regulation at 
issue here.”
93 The Justices in Cipollone disagreed about several aspects of the FCLAA 
preemption provision’s scope, and two concurrences were filed in addition to Justice 
Steven’s main opinion. However, according to the Court in Vango, all three opinions in 
Cipollone agreed that Congress intended the FCLAA preemption provision to preempt 
“positive enactments such as statutes and regulations.”
94 The court in Cipollone also 
noted that the 1969 amendments to FCLAA broadened the Act’s scope by prohibiting 
local laws creating requirements “with respect to the advertising or promotion,”
95 rather 
than the original text disallowing local requirements for statements “in the advertising.”
96  
The City argued that the Local Law was not preempted because it “[did] not 
require or prohibit anything with respect to the content, format or display of cigarette 
advertisements.”
97 Following Cipollone’s precedent, the court rejected this argument and 
read the preemption provision of FCLAA quite liberally. The Court stated that the Local 
Law was within the scope of the preemption provision because it “condition[ed] the 
legality of displaying cigarette advertisements on compliance with the letter of the Local 
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Law.”
98 The court also rejected the City’s argument that the preemption provision does 
not reach the Local Law because the law does not regulate tobacco promoters or 
advertisers themselves, but rather those who own advertising space. In response, the court 
stated that the provision preempts local rules with respect to cigarette promotion or 
advertising and is not limited to laws that affect promoters or advertisers.
99 In short, the 
court held that the preemption provision applies when a local law is triggered by the 
placement of cigarette advertisements or when a local law “operates upon the same 
object” as the Federal Act.
100 Further, the court cited Congress’s second stated purpose of 
FCLAA, to avoid impeding commerce. Reading the Act consistently with this purpose, 
the court concluded that the Local Law undermined Congress’s intent by creating 
obligations that were exactly “diverse, nonuniform, and confusing.”
101  
The City appealed the ruling, but the 2
nd Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the 
District Court’s ruling one year after the initial decision. The Appeals court 
acknowledged the “laudable purpose” of the Local Law,
102 but agreed with the lower 
court that the means of achieving that purpose were unlawful. The court echoed 
Madison’s advocacy of centralization, expressing a strong view of preemption as 
necessary to give force to the Supremacy Clause,
103 while it gave a brief nod towards the 
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presumption, motivated by federalism concerns, against federal preemption of states’ 
police powers.
104 
The Appeals Court took on its “relatively straightforward” task to “determine 
whether the Local Law is within the domain expressly preempted” by breaking down the 
preemption clause of FCLAA into its “three essential phrases:”
105 whether the law is a 
“requirement,” “based on smoking and health,” “with respect to the advertising or 
promotion of any cigarettes.” First, according to the court, Cipollone established that a 
“positive enactment” like the Local Law is plainly a “requirement” for the purposes of 
FCLAA.
106 Second, the court rejected the City’s argument that passage of the Local Law 
was motivated by the economic costs of smoking, as evidenced by a portion of the Local 
Law’s declaration of legislative findings and intent that discussed the increased 
healthcare costs and loss of productivity caused by smoking among City residents.
107 The 
court took a broader view of the intent and effect of the Local Law, and concluded that 
economic concerns were “secondary” to health as the City’s motivation.
108  
Last, the court, admitting that this prong of its inquiry was the “most 
contentious,”
109 concluded that the Local Law created obligations with respect to 
advertising or promotion of cigarettes, even if it did so “only at the edges.”
110 The court 
performed a textual analysis to delineate the scope of FCLAA’s preemption clause, 
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focusing on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to.”
111 The Appeals court cited the 
Supreme Court’s treatment of this phrase in Cipollone and its expansive reading of the 
similar phrase, “relating to,” in its relevant jurisprudence.
112 Acknowledging that the 
actual cigarette advertisements would not look different were the Local Law enforced, 
nor was the Law aimed at advertisers or promoters, the court found the fact that 
“advertisers and promoters like Vango would be substantially impacted” persuasive.
113 
Further, the court speculated that it may not have read FCLAA’s original language to 
preempt the local law, but, like the Cipollone court, it was influenced by the broadening 
effect of the 1969 amendment.
114 Although the court recognized the potential benefits of 
the law, it based its conclusion solely on its reading of Congress’s clear intent to preempt 
this type of City ordinance. 
B. Tobacco Advertising Restriction Near Schools and Playgrounds 
  Despite the defeat in Vango, New York City continued to pursue legislation with 
the goal of decreasing the health and economic burden of cigarette smoking among its 
residents. In 1998, the City Council voted overwhelmingly
115 to pass the “Youth 
Protection Against Tobacco Advertising and Promotion Act,”
116 after at least six public 
hearings had been held on the matter in as many months.
117 This portion of the 
Administrative Code (Article 17-A) prohibited placement of advertising of tobacco 
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products “within one thousand feet, in any direction, of any school building, playground, 
child day care center, amusement arcade or youth center, in any outdoor area.”
118 Further, 
advertisements on the interior of buildings within the same radius were prohibited if they 
were likely to be visible from outside.
119 Exceptions were made for motor vehicles,
120 
some displays of Cigarette Company names,
121 and, notably, for generic black and white 
signs (sometimes called “tombstone” signs
122), under a specified maximum size, that 
merely indicated that tobacco products were sold on premises.
123 Article 17-A granted the 
City the right to seek injunctive relief to remove advertisements in violation of the 
ordinance,
124 but it did not impose criminal liability on violators.
125  
  Immediately after Mayor Giuliani signed the law, a District Court Judge blocked 
enforcement of Article 17-A pending the outcome of a lawsuit filed by a trade association 
of small grocery stores, a group of national associations of advertisers, and a New York 
professional association with members from the advertising field.
126 Opponents of 17-A 
characterized it as an attempt by the City to meddle in legitimate advertising activities 
and as outside the scope of City authority,
127 and the District Court largely agreed, 
granting summary judgment to the plaintiffs.  As in Vango, the plaintiffs brought both a 
First Amendment violation claim and FCLAA preemption challenge; and, as in Vango, 
the Court avoided the constitutional issue by deciding the case based on an analysis of 
                                                        
118 Administrative Code § 27-508.3(a) 
119 Administrative Code § 27-508.3(b). 
120 Administrative Code § 27-508.3(e). 
121 Administrative Code § 27-508.3(d), § 27-508.5. 
122 Greater New York Metro. Food Council, 1998 WL 879721, 1 
123 Administrative Code § 27-508.3(c). 
124 Administrative Code § 27-508.4, § 27-508.6. 
125 Administrative Code § 27-508.7. 
126 Goodnough, supra.  
127 Id.    24 
FCLAA’s preemption clause. The Court relied on the “clear guidance” provided by the 
Second Circuit in Vango
128 and applied the “three essential phrases” analysis that case 
established, using Cipollone to inform its interpretation of the scope of the FCLAA 
preemption provision. 
  The court found that 17-A was clearly a “requirement,” but it characterized the 
other two phrases as more contentious. On the question of whether 17-A created 
requirements “based on smoking and health,” the City argued, as it had in Vango, that the 
bill was motivated by non-health related concerns. In this case, the non-health concern 
the City invoked was the lack of enforcement of a pre-existing City law that prohibited 
the sale of tobacco to minors; in fact, the express purpose of the ordinance focused on 
this concern and did not mention health. However, the Court refused to take the City’s 
stated purpose “at face value,”
129 noting that the majority of references at the public 
hearings related to children’s health and that health was in fact the underlying purpose of 
17-A.
130 Because “the health dangers posed to youth from smoking was of paramount 
importance in enacting the ordinance…the Court concludes that Article 17-A is ‘based on 
smoking and health.’”
131 
  Whether the third phrase, “with respect to the advertising or promotion of any 
cigarettes,” was fulfilled “engendered the deepest split of opinions in this litigation.”
132 In 
this case, the City argued for the Court to recognize a distinction between those 
requirements affecting the content of cigarette advertisements and those affecting their 
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location, with the latter being outside the scope of FCLAA preemption. The court 
rejected this distinction, again citing Vango in support of its reading of the “with respect 
to” part of the phrase as connoting “broad preemptive effect.”
133 The court also asserted 
that, even if it did adopt the City’s proposed distinction, its decision would not change,
134 
because the “tombstone” sign provision of 17-A mandated the content of the generic 
signs – indeed, 17-A specified the exact text, color, and size of these signs.
135   
The City found some success in its Appeal to the Second Circuit Court.
136 Upon 
reviewing the District Court’s findings de novo the Appeals court took a narrower view 
of FCLAA preemption, holding that only one provision, the “tombstone” sign 
requirement, of 17-A was preempted by FCLAA. The Court declined to read the FCLAA 
preemption provision literally, stating that such a reading would lead to absurd results in 
which a City could be disallowed from “prohibit[ing] a cigarette company from handing 
out free cigarettes in an elementary school yard.”
137 Further, the court cautioned against 
overly expansive readings in the preemption context as “subvert[ing] the presumption 
against preemption.”
138 Accordingly, the Second Circuit took a less textual and more 
purposive approach than did the District Court, asserting that even broad language like 
“with respect to,” should only be given effect as far as required to implement 
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congressional intent
139 – in this case to avoid “diverse, nonuniform, and confusing” 
advertising standards.
140 
With this Congressional intent in mind, the Court held that the tombstone 
provision was preempted because it created “unique regulations governing the content 
and format of cigarette advertising information.”
141 The City offered two arguments on 
this matter, neither of which the Court found persuasive. First, the City argued that the 
provision was not a “requirement” because it only created voluntary obligations since 
retailers were not required to post tombstone signs at all. In response, the court stated that 
the provision did in fact impose conditions upon the display of these signs and therefore 
was not distinguishable from Vango in this respect. Second, the City claimed, as it had in 
the District Court, that 17-A was not “based on smoking and health” because it was 
motivated by law enforcement concerns rather than health. The Court instead followed 
Vango by looking “both [to] the purpose of the ordinance as a whole, and [to] the 
ordinance's actual effect, to determine whether it is ‘based on smoking and health’”
142 
and finding that a concern for health was “inherent” to 17-A.
143  
Yet the Court went on to state that, except for the tombstone sign requirement, 17-
A created only location restrictions, and therefore did not impose obligations “with 
respect to” advertising. According to the court, location-only restrictions, just like zoning 
regulations, do not burden advertisers or undermine the comprehensive federal 
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scheme:
144 the judge could not see how “mere location restrictions can lead to the sort of 
‘diverse, nonuniform, and confusing’ advertising standards that Congress sought to avoid 
when it enacted § 1334(b).”
145 Further, the Circuit Court stated that the presumption 
against preemption is particularly strong when dealing with States’ traditional police 
powers – of which zoning regulations and those directed at children’s safety and welfare 
are among the most fundamental and “intensely local.”
146 The intent of Congress was not 
sufficiently clearly stated to overcome such traditional state powers. 
  This small victory for the City was destined to be short-lived. Although a petition 
for a writ of certiorari submitted by the Plaintiffs was denied,
147 a case based on a 
controversy related to a strikingly similar law reached the Supreme Court in 2001 and 
abrogated the effect of the Second Circuit’s decision.
148 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly 
involved a FCLAA preemption challenge, brought by four cigarette manufacturers,
149 a 
maker of smokeless tobacco products,
150 and several cigar manufacturers and retailers, to 
a law passed in Massachusetts. Like 17-A, the law at issue in Lorillard prohibited parties 
from displaying tobacco product advertisements either outdoors or indoors and visible 
from the outside, “in any location that is within a 1,000 foot radius of any public 
playground, playground area in a public park, elementary school or secondary school”
151 
and from placing advertisements “lower than five feet from the floor of any retail 
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establishment” within this radius.
152 Further, the Massachusetts Act created a 
“tombstone” sign exception very similar to that of 17-A.
153 
  Writing for the Court, Justice O’Connor engaged in a similar process of statutory 
interpretation as the court in Vango, comparing the original and amended language of the 
preemption provision to conclude that Congress intended to expand its reach.
154 First, the 
court found that the “with respect to” element of FCLAA was fulfilled because “there is 
no question about an indirect relationship between the [Massachusetts] regulations and 
cigarette advertising because the regulations expressly target cigarette advertising.”
155 
Next, the Court echoed the District Court in Greater Metro Food Council when it choose 
to reject the State’s argument that the “based on smoking and health” element was not 
fulfilled because, “the youth exposure concern is intertwined with the smoking and health 
concern.”
156 Further, Justice O’Connor found the content-location distinction that 
Massachusetts and New York City had introduced to be inconsistent with the text and the 
purpose of FCLAA,
157 despite having “some surface appeal.”
158  
Justice O’Connor went on to briefly address the extent to which “local community 
interests” were restricted by the holding in this case. She attempted to specify the outer 
limits of the Court’s holding by stating that FCLAA preemption does not prevent states 
or cities from “enact[ing] generally applicable zoning restrictions on the location and size 
of advertisements that apply to cigarettes on equal terms with other products” or from 
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“regulat[ing] conduct as it relates to the sale or use of cigarettes.”
159 In other words, 
despite the fact that, “from a policy perspective, it is understandable for the States to 
attempt to prevent minors from using tobacco products,”
160 Massachusetts could ban 
cigarette advertisements near schools and playgrounds only if it banned advertisements 
for all other products in the same enactment. Justice O’Connor went on to explain that, 
although the policy choices of local governments with respect to a local concern are 
limited by the enactment by Congress of a comprehensive scheme that attempts to 
address that same concern, “States and localities remain free to combat the problem of 
underage tobacco use by appropriate means.”
161 
Justice Stevens offered a dissenting opinion with respect to Justice O’Connor’s 
determination of FCLAA preemption, with which three other Justices joined. Justice 
Stevens emphasized that “under prevailing principles, any examination of the scope of a 
preemption provision must start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the 
States [are] not to be superseded by...Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest 
purpose of Congress.”
162 Justice Stevens went on to say that preemption provisions 
should be interpreted narrowly when applied to regulations, like the one at issue in 
Lorillard, which implicate “powers that lie at the heart of the States' traditional police 
power.”
163  
This type of narrow reading of the FCLAA preemption provision, in the context 
of the Act’s purpose, structure, and legislative history, lead the dissenters to conclude that 
                                                        
159 Id.  
160 Id, at 570. 
161 Id, at 571. 
162 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 591 (Stevens, J. concurring in part, 
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (internal quotes removed).  
163 Id.   30 
“all signs point inescapably to”
164 a content-location distinction in the FCLAA 
preemption provision.
165 Only preemption of the content of cigarette advertising would 
be necessary to achieve Congress’s intention to prevent a “difficult and 
costly…patchwork regulatory system.”
166 On the other hand, location-based regulations 
would not even “impose a significant administrative burden” advertisers, because 
“divergent local zoning restrictions on the location of sign advertising are a commonplace 
feature of the national landscape and cigarette advertisers have always been bound to 
observe them.”
167 Further, restrictions on the location of advertising would not be 
confusing because “laws prohibiting a cigarette company from hanging a billboard near a 
school in Boston in no way conflict with laws permitting the hanging of such a billboard 
in other jurisdictions.”  
To address the claim by the Court’s majority that the 1969 amendment had 
greatly expanded the scope of FCLAA’s preemption provision, Justice Stevens argued 
that when the provision is not “ripped from its context…it is quite clear that the 1969 
amendments were intended to expand the provision to capture a narrow set of content 
regulations…not to fundamentally reorder the division of regulatory authority.”
168 
Although Lorillard did not specifically overrule Greater Metro, it did indirectly 
abrogate its holding. The New York Times characterized the case as a victory for tobacco 
companies, and speculated that the decision “may well have a fatal effect” on the New 
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York’s similar law, as well as laws passed in Chicago and Baltimore.
169 Jeffrey D. 
Friedlander, first assistant corporation counsel for the City of New York stated that it 
would be “unlikely given today's decision by the Supreme Court” that New York could 
find “differences that would allow the city to argue that our law can go into effect.”
170  
C. Point of purchase posters
171 
 
  One of New York City’s most recent efforts to discourage cigarette smoking 
among its residents was a counter-advertising campaign passed into law in September, 
2009 that required bodegas, convenient stores, and other businesses selling cigarettes to 
post “tobacco health warning and smoking cessation signage” near the cash register or 
where cigarettes were displayed.
172 The New York City Health Department proposed the 
rule that, for the first time in the country, would require people about to buy cigarettes at 
the corner store to be confronted with images of “what a blackened lung looks like…what 
mouth cancer looks like…what it looks like when you have throat cancer.”
173 Over the 
summer, the department worked on drafting the law and announced a plan to hold a 
hearing and vote.
174 
  During the months the law was in effect, it created specific requirements for 
stores that fell under its control, comprising approximately 12,000 retail stores in the 
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municipality.
175 The law applied to any person in the business of selling cigarettes face-
to-face to consumers in New York City.
176 These businesses had to use signage designed 
by the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DHMH), which were to contain 
information about the adverse health effects of tobacco used, a pictorial image illustrating 
these effects, and information about how to get help to quit using tobacco.
177 The signs 
would be produced in two sizes from which retailers could choose; one no larger than 1 
square foot – meant to be small enough to fit on a cash register – and the other, as large 
as 4 square feet.
178 The small sign was to be posted “on or within 3 inches of each cash 
register…unobstructed…and…read easily,”
179 while the large sign was to be posted at 
the place in the store where tobacco products at a specified height.
180 The retail stores 
were required to display modified signage if DHMH chose to edit the content of the 
posters,
181 and the owners could be prosecuted through an agency adjudicative 
proceeding for any violation.
182 DHMH ultimately designed three signs: one depicted a 
brain damaged by a stroke, another showed a decaying tooth and gums, and the last 
displayed a diseased lung.
183  
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  After the “gruesome” posters were developed and released, two New York Retail 
Associations, the country’s three largest tobacco companies,
184 and two individual New 
York City grocery stores
185 promptly sued the City. Through the media, these parties 
announced their claim that the antismoking poster rule violated the First Amendment 
rights of the retail stores by forcing the stores to “undertake…advocacy on behalf of the 
city”
186 The Plaintiffs were eventually granted summary judgment, but not on the claim 
of a First Amendment violation. Rather, Judge Rakoff of the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of New York held that the New York City law was preempted 
by FCLAA.
187 The court did not reach the other grounds claimed by the plaintiffs: that 
the law constituted a free speech violation and that the Board of Health had exceeded its 
authority by promulgating the rule.  
Not surprisingly, Judge Rakoff’s ruling focused most heavily on an analysis of 
FCLAA’s preemption provision. The City conceded that the ordinance is a “requirement 
based on smoking and health,”
188 so the analysis focused on the “with respect to 
advertising or promotion of any cigarettes” portion of the provision. In the City’s 
defense, it first argued that a reading of the provision must construe the phrase “with 
respect to” sufficiently narrowly so not to lead to absurd results.
189 If read literally, the 
City argued, this provision could preempt even state laws designed to curb fraud in 
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cigarette advertising and promotion.
190 Similarly to the court in Vango, the District Court 
here cited FCLAA’s legislative history, particularly the 1969 amendment, to discount this 
argument in favor of a narrow reading of the Act. Holding that the test articulated by the 
Second Circuit in Vango applied equally to promotion as it did to advertising, the court 
articulated a refined rule, stating, “A local regulation with even an indirect relationship to 
cigarette… promotion is nonetheless preempted by [FCLAA] if it imposes conditions that 
substantially impact such …promotion.”
191 Applying this rule, the court held that “calling 
for tobacco retailers to post a large anti-smoking sign…plainly imposes conditions on the 
promotion of cigarettes.” As for the smaller sign posted near the cash register, the court 
said, “A clear nexus still exists.”
192 
Next, the City argued that most precedent on preemption under FCLAA dealt 
with advertising as opposed to promotion, as did the controversy in Vango. The word 
“promotion” is not defined within the act itself, and the City argued for a narrow 
conception of the word “promotion” that would include only activities that “add extra 
value to the consumers’ underlying purchase, [such as] a discount…[or] free samples.”
193 
The court, however, read the word promotion as a commercial term of art to include “any 
act…that furthers the sale of merchandise,”
194 and in the context of cigarette advertising, 
to clearly encompass point-of-purchase displays.
195 Further, the court stated that the 
addition of the word “promotion” to FCLAA’s preemption provision in the 1969 
                                                        
190 Id.  
191 Id, at 4, (quoting Vango, 34 F.3d 68, at 71-75) (internal quotation marks removed).  
192 Id, at 4.  
193 Id, at 3 
194 Id, at 3, (quoting Jones v. Vilsack, 272 F.3d 1030, 1036 (8
th Cir. 2001)) (internal 
quotations removed).  
195 Id, at 4.    35 
amendments, along with the modification that added the phrase “with respect to,” served 
to indicate Congress’s intention to broaden the preemptive scope of the Act.
196 Using the 
its reading of Congress’s intent based on legislative history to bolster its interpretation of 
the “plain meaning” of the provision, the court concluded that the public health posters 
required by the ordinance constituted promotion under FCLAA “by any standard.”
197 The 
City plans to appeal.
198  
IV. Conclusion  
 
In all of these cases, with the exception of the dissenters in Lorillard and the 
Second Circuit Judge who wrote the decision in the Greater Metro Food Council appeal, 
the court did no more than acknowledge the presumption against preemption. Its 
relevance to their analysis seemed to end there. In contrast, their reverence for the 
Supremacy Clause is strong. It may seem as though a principle that is explicit in the 
Constitution should be given more weight than a common law “presumption,” but this 
presumption reflects a concern for Federalism – a principle that is also enshrined in the 
Constitution, in the powers reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment.  By not 
fully considering this presumption, the opinions can be less than satisfying. In Vango, for 
example, it remains unclear from the court’s argument why this law would be particularly 
“confusing” with respect to cigarette advertising. 
The non-conforming judges found a way to reconcile the Tenth Amendment and 
Article VI of the Constitution by considering the values implicated by each when 
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interpreting the Congressional grant of authority represented by FCLAA. Their 
interpretation did a better job of protecting the comprehensive federal scheme established 
by Congress through FCLAA from being undermined by local laws, without invalidating 
local laws that did not threaten the Act’s purpose. If the preemption clause is in fact 
ambiguous, as it likely is given the 5-4 split of Supreme Court justices on the question of 
its proper scope, then, for the reasons stated above, cities should be given a wide berth as 
when seeking achieve laudable public health goals. It is ironic and unfortunate that, under 
FCLAA preemption jurisprudence, cities must avoid characterizing local laws as 
motivated by health concerns in order to avoid preemption.  
Through its savings and preservation provisions, FSPTCA is unlikely to be used 
to invalidate local laws to the extent that FCLAA has. The legal regime that it creates has 
left space for “local sensibilities.” This paper illustrates that Cities can experience very 
real limitations when Congress instead includes an express preemption provision like the 
one in FCLAA. New York City has been able to enact strict regulations with respect to 
smoking, including a recent victory in which the City expanded its smoking ban to parks 
and beaches.
199 But if courts took the presumption against preemption more seriously, 
cities like New York would gain valuable policy-making power, making them better able 
to address local problems and to shape their own identity as one of our democratic 
society’s “multiple utopias.”  
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